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FORMATIVE PROJECTS, FORMATIVE INFLUENCES: OF
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN AND FEMINIST, LIBERAL,
AND VULNERABLE SUBJECTS
Linda C. McClain*
INTRODUCTION
Martha Albertson Fineman is a truly generative scholar. She generates
significant and transformative scholarship, causing people to think in new ways
about keywords like “dependency,” “autonomy,” and “vulnerability,” and basic
institutions such as family and state. She also generates conversations
(uncomfortable1 and otherwise, crossing disciplinary and other boundaries) and,
in so doing, sparks the generation of new scholarship by others, through her
founding and directing of (since the 1980s) the Feminism and Legal Theory
(FLT) Project and (in the last decade) the Vulnerability and the Human
Condition Initiative. I count myself among those who have benefitted from both
forms of her generativity.2 It is fitting and timely that the editors of Emory Law
Journal honor her with this tribute issue. I am grateful for the opportunity to
contribute to it.
This Essay reflects on Professor Fineman’s generative scholarship by
revisiting my engagement with her work over the years. Such revisiting is, in a
sense, an intellectual autobiography, since I trace the shifting areas of concern
in my scholarship and the role of various formative influences upon it. Often
those influences were in evident, but productive, tension, such as with feminism
and liberalism. In this revisiting, I also observe some critical shifts in Fineman’s
own scholarly projects, such as from dependency to vulnerability and from a
gender lens to a skepticism about a focus on identities. Another formative
influence I discuss in this Essay is Fineman’s enormously generative
contribution to the development of scholarship by creating spaces for sharing

*
Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law. I am
grateful to Rachel Rebouche for helpful comments on this Essay and to B.U. Law librarian Lauren O’Malley for
research assistance. Thanks also to my editor, Caleah Whitten, for her careful work on this article.
1
I refer here to Professor Fineman’s development of the “Uncomfortable Conversation” as a way to
frame workshops on contentious topics.
2
This opening paragraph borrows from the language of an e-mail I sent to the members of the
Association of American Law Schools’ Section on Women in Legal Education upon the announcement (by
Chair Rebecca E. Zietlow) that Professor Fineman won the section’s Ruth Bader Ginsburg Lifetime
Achievement Award for 2017. Posting of Linda McClain, Professor, Boston University School of Law,
support@lists.aals.org, to SECTWO.aals@lists.aals.org (Sept. 27, 2016) (on file with author).
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and critiquing scholarship, through the FLT Project and, more recently, the
Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative.
I.

FEMINIST AND LIBERAL FORMATIVE INFLUENCES

A. The Geography of Influence
When I began my career as a law professor, I lived on the Upper West Side
of Manhattan, equidistant (more or less) from two law schools—Columbia
University and N.Y.U. That geographical positioning had both practical and
symbolic significance. In the 1990s, my initial work as a feminist legal scholar
argued for the merits of liberal feminism, despite pervasive feminist critiques of
liberal legal and political theory and liberalism. In my first law review article, I
argued that prominent strands of feminist jurisprudence presented a caricatured
picture of liberalism as “exalt[ing] rights over responsibilities, separateness over
connection,” justice over care, “and the individual over the community.”3 I
focused particularly on relational feminism, or “difference feminism,” often
inspired by Carol Gilligan’s In A Different Voice and articulated by such feminist
legal scholars as Robin West and Suzanne Sherry.4 Challenging the model of
“atomistic man” attributed to liberalism and feminist critiques of such liberal
ideals as autonomy, I examined the liberal theories of political philosopher John
Rawls and legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin to illustrate common ground
between liberal theory and relational feminist theory around issues like the
relationship between justice and care.5 Alongside those efforts to show affinities
in bodies of “grand theory,” my early work also focused on concrete issues like
privacy rights, reproductive rights and responsibilities, and welfare reform.6

3
Linda C. McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (1992) [hereinafter McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited].
4
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT
(1982); see Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV.
543, 581–84, 591 (1986) (contrasting “masculine” and “feminine” paradigms and arguing that “the development
of the nation’s ideology has paralleled individual moral development in the male pattern,” and, thus, “distorted”
our legal system); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988) (advancing the
“separation thesis” and the “connection thesis” to explain men’s and women’s different experiences and arguing
that the legal system and modern jurisprudence reflect the former). For discussion of these theories, see McClain,
“Atomistic Man” Revisited, supra note 3, at 1180–84.
5
See McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited, supra note 3, at 1203–28.
6
See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195 (1995); Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339
(1996) [hereinafter McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction]; Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43
DUKE L.J. 989 (1994); Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119 (1992)
[McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?].
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Two significant spaces in which I wrestled with these tensions between
feminism and liberalism were Professor Fineman’s FLT Project, newly
relocated to Columbia University,7 and the Colloquium on Law, Philosophy, and
Political Theory (the Colloquium), convened by legal philosopher Ronald
Dworkin and philosopher Thomas Nagel at N.Y.U. As an LL.M. student at
N.Y.U. I took that Colloquium, which provided the chance to deepen my
understanding of liberal political and legal theory and to wrestle with bringing
feminist perspectives to bear on such theory. As a new professor, I continued to
attend the Colloquium and enjoyed the intellectual community it afforded. On
the recommendation of Professor Sylvia Law, I first met Professor Fineman
while I was a student at N.Y.U.8 At our first meeting, Martha listened patiently
to some of my embryonic ideas for future scholarly articles, and generously
invited me to participate in FLT Project workshops and conferences.
Both of those spaces—the FLT Project and the Colloquium—nurtured my
development as I attempted to elaborate my own liberal feminist approach. The
first academic conference in which I presented my work as a new law professor
was Professor Fineman’s FLT workshop “Reproductive Issues in a Post-Roe
World,”9 which, coincidentally, was also the first FLT Project workshop held
under the auspices of the project’s new home at Columbia University. That
workshop, held in November 1991, took place in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent upholding of new restrictions on abortion (in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services) and as the Court considered (in what became
Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey) a fresh set of state
restrictions challenging Roe’s framework.10
The workshop exemplified several remarkable features of the FLT Project
and why participating in such workshops was so exciting and valuable. First, the
topic itself was timely and, as Professor Fineman explained, “urgent,” in light of
“the changing political shape of the United States Supreme Court.”11 Second,
the workshop defined “reproductive issues” broadly, looking not only at the
immediate issue of abortion rights but also at issues such as the impact of
7
Professor Fineman first founded the FLT Project in 1984 while at the University of Wisconsin–
Madison. See The Feminism and Legal Theory Project: History, EMORY L., http://law.emory.edu/faculty-andscholarship/centers/feminism-and-legal-theory-project.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
8
Professor Sylvia Law, with whom I studied at N.Y.U., supervised what became my first law review
article in feminist jurisprudence (McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited, supra note 3).
9
The workshop resulted in a symposium in the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, to which I
contributed. See McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, supra note 6.
10
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
11
Martha Albertson Fineman, Introduction, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 1 (1992).
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assisted reproductive technology on women and the regulation of midwifery.12
Third, in both the selection of papers and presenters and in its attendees, the
workshop crossed disciplinary, global, and generational lines.13 Feminist
lawyers and scholars involved in Roe and other reproductive rights efforts shared
their insights with new feminist scholars. Fourth, the valuable conversations the
workshop generated took place not only in the formal context of presenting and
commenting on papers but also during breaks, lunches, and dinner. Further, as
would often be the case in years to come, that workshop generated published
scholarship: in this instance, a symposium in the newly formed Columbia
Journal of Gender and Law. In this way, Professor Fineman’s FLT Project
inspired law students and engaged them in the production of feminist legal
scholarship, while also facilitating the feminist scholarship itself.14 For example,
being included as a paper presenter allowed me to turn a seminar paper written
at N.Y.U.15 into a law review article (The Poverty of Privacy?) that argued for
the continuing importance of the right to privacy in a “revised Roe” world,
critiqued the near-disappearance of privacy in the joint opinion of Planned
Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, and cautioned about some of
the risks—in light of this disappearance and Casey’s vision of women’s decision
making—of feminist calls to focus more on responsibility than on privacy and
rights in justifying reproductive freedom.16
In the ensuing years, sharing my work in the FLT Project’s various
workshops and conferences provided regular occasions for constructive
engagement and critique. Even when I was not presenting work, attending these
events provided the pleasure of feminist companionship and of learning from an
ever-expanding circle of scholars from different disciplines—and countries—
tackling a wide range of issues. Professor Fineman also tackled—and sought to
make accessible to us—methods and forms of discourse often seen as in tension
with feminist inquiry or goals. For example, she convened more than one FLT
Project event to focus on the prominent influence of economic theory and
methodology in law (“law and economics”) and to consider feminist criticisms
12

Id.
The workshop, held from November 15 to 16, 1991, included reproductive rights attorneys and
activists, as well as junior and senior scholars, and scholars from the United States, Canada, and Australia. The
published symposium, see infra note 14, captures some of that diversity.
14
See Fineman, supra note 11 (noting that this issue of the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law was
dedicated to the workshop). For another example, see Symposium, Discrimination and Inequality: Emerging
Issues, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (1999–2000), discussed infra Part II.
15
I wrote the initial paper in a class on Women and the Law, taught by then-adjunct professor and NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund lawyer Sally Goldfarb, who is now a professor at Rutgers University.
16
See McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, supra note 6 (discussing and critiquing proposals by Ruth
Colker and Robin West).
13
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and responses, including enlisting economic concepts and rhetoric to feminist
ends. That critical engagement resulted in an interdisciplinary edited volume,
Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, to which I was fortunate to
contribute.17 Similarly, some years later, Professor Fineman convened an
illuminating “Uncomfortable Conversation” about the increasing prominence of
sociobiology and evolutionary psychology (sometimes enlisted to explain sex
inequality and women’s and men’s different choices), and feminist legal
theory’s engagement with such approaches.18 These are just a few examples of
the way that Professor Fineman encouraged feminist legal scholars to confront
and engage with different forms of discourse. Over the years, it was my pleasure
to contribute to some of the edited volumes that Professor Fineman produced as
the fruit of many of those workshops and uncomfortable conversations at
Columbia and, subsequently, Cornell Law School and Emory University School
of Law.19
As I traveled between the FLT Project and the Colloquium, however, I often
experienced a sense of cognitive dissonance as I confronted the tensions between
the distinct theoretical conversations and preoccupations of the two
communities. In the Colloquium, as liberal luminaries presented works in
progress in liberal political or constitutional theory, it often fell to feminist
voices in the room to raise “the woman question” or to ask how gender mattered
to the problem with which the author grappled.20 I found myself, for example,
introducing relevant feminist perspectives and scholarship to liberal theorists.21

17
See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, Deterring “Irresponsible” Reproduction Through Welfare Reform, in
FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY 225 (Martha Albertson Fineman &
Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
18
Emory University School of Law Uncomfortable Conversation: Sociobiology, Evolutionary
Psychology, and Feminist Legal Theory (Dec. 1–2, 2006). At that conversation, I presented a paper, Social
Cooperation Between Men and Women: A Universal? On What Terms?. I presented a more developed version,
Feminist Law Reform as Social Engineering?, at “Transcending the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal
Theory Project’s Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Conference,” held at Emory University School of Law from
November 6 to 8, 2008. That paper was later published. See Linda C. McClain, What’s So Hard About Sex
Equality?: Nature, Culture, and Social Engineering, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:
GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 67 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011) [hereinafter
McClain, What’s So Hard About Sex Equality?].
19
See McClain, Deterring “Irresponsible” Reproduction Through Welfare Reform, supra note 17;
McClain, What’s So Hard About Sex Equality?, supra note 18; Linda C. McClain, Child, Family, State, and
Gender Equality in Religious Stances and Human Rights Instruments: A Preliminary Comparison, in WHAT IS
RIGHT FOR CHILDREN?: THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Karen Worthington eds., 2009) [hereinafter McClain, Child, Family, State and Gender Equality].
20
One such prominent voice was Drucilla Cornell, then at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. To be
sure, the philosopher Frances Kamm frequently participated, although not from a distinctly feminist perspective.
21
For example, I had such conversations about relevant feminist arguments with Ronald Dworkin when
he presented draft chapters of his book on abortion rights. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN
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At FLT Project workshops and conferences, feminist presenters often delivered
critiques of liberalism—and sometimes liberal feminism—that stung but also
challenged me to formulate a response. Even so, as I continued to define my
liberal and liberal feminist orientation and draw on those traditions in my work,
Professor Fineman was always welcoming.22 Looking back, I realize that the
liberalism targeted in some of those critiques was not the liberal political and
constitutional theory with which I engaged, which supported various affirmative
governmental obligations. Instead it was the neoliberalism prominent in political
discourse, used to justify neoclassical economics, with a focus on free markets
and “efficiency,” and to criticize social welfare programs, with a focus on
economic redistribution and reducing inequality.23 Indeed, in the mid-1990s, I
allied with Professor Fineman and various feminist and progressive scholars in
publicly opposing the congressional attack on Aid to Families with Defendant
Children (AFDC) in the name of “personal responsibility” and “welfare
reform.”24
B. Generative Ideas
Turning to the influence of Professor Fineman’s work itself, in my early
career this influence was both methodological and substantive. On the point of
method, Fineman cautioned against both overly abstract and categorical grand
theory—ungrounded in the particular realities of women’s lives—and overly
particular narratives, urging instead for a “mid-level” theory.25 Eschewing
either-or answers about sameness and difference, formal or substantive equality,
Fineman argued that women live “gendered lives,” revealed not by essentialist
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 50–60 (1994) (discussing, in the
section on “Feminism,” arguments by Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West about abortion). I was also in
conversation with John Rawls, a frequent presenter in the Colloquium, about feminist critiques of his political
liberalism. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997) (citing McClain,
“Atomistic Man” Revisited, supra note 3, as one of several works that had “encouraged [him] to think that a
liberal account of equal justice for women is viable”).
22
I recall at an FLT Project event Martha joked that she still had hope for me.
23
See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, The Politics of Economics in Welfare Reform, in FEMINISM
CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS, supra note 17, at 193, 194.
24
Professor Fineman, Professor Matthew Diller, Professor Kendall Thomas, and I worked on a statement
by law professors opposing the draft Personal Responsibility Act. Contract with America—Welfare Reform:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 1488–89
(1995) (joint statement of Matthew Diller, Fordham University School of Law; Martha Albertson Fineman,
Columbia University School of Law; Linda C. McClain, Hofstra University School of Law; and Kendall
Thomas, Columbia University School of Law).
25
See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future of Relational Feminism: Robin West’s Caring for
Justice, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 477, 494 (1999) (citing Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing
Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25, 25–28 (1990) [hereinafter Fineman,
Challenging Law]).
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claims about “all women” or “all men,” but by investigation of women’s
experience, and that such experience provides a basis for cooperation.26
Professor Martha Fineman’s substantive work on the ideology of
motherhood was a major influence when I wrote a lengthy law review article—
presented in a timely FLT Project workshop “Women, Children, and
Poverty”27—critically evaluating the welfare debates that culminated in the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
of 1996.28 My article, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, evaluated the rhetoric of
irresponsible reproduction in congressional debates and other public discourse,
arguing that such rhetoric “reveals three paradigmatic models of
irresponsibility—the single mother, the welfare mother, and the teen mother—
and three corresponding aspects of irresponsibility—immorality,
unaccountability, and incapacity.”29 Like many others, I enlisted Fineman’s
critique, set forth powerfully in her book The Neutered Mother, the Sexual
Family and Other Twentieth-Century Tragedies, of the idea of the “single
mother” as “deviant” because of her singleness and her deft analysis of how
images of single mothers as pathological featured in public discourse about
poverty.30 My article also called for “[e]nriching [p]ublic [d]iscourse [a]bout
[r]eproduction and [r]esponsibility,” by injecting “feminist analysis” to counter
the “reductive stories about motivation and rationality” and “problematic gender
ideology” that were “advanced to support efforts to eliminate irresponsibility.”31
Looking back on that article now, I am confident that Professor Fineman’s
insightful analysis of keywords, such as “welfare,” “dependency,” and “single
26
See, e.g., McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited, supra note 3, at 1188 n.73 (citing Fineman,
Challenging Law, supra note 25, at 37–41); Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental
Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 38 n.56
(1998) [hereinafter McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives] (arguing
against equality as “gender neutrality” and instead using alternative approaches focused upon the “unequal
‘reality’ of many women’s lives” (quoting MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 175 (1991) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY])).
27
I presented the draft article, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, at “Women, Children, and Poverty,
Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop,” held at Columbia Law School from June 6 to 10, 1995. I still remember
some of the incisive comments participants gave on the draft, particularly questions about how feminists should
respond to attacks on single mothers, e.g., whether to distinguish among types of single mothers (affluent
mothers like Murphy Brown—criticized by Vice President Dan Quayle as a bad role model—and poor mothers
receiving AFDC).
28
McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, supra note 6.
29
Id. at 342.
30
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 101–42 (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER] (analyzing “[t]he
[c]onstruction of [m]aternal [d]eviancy in [p]overty [d]iscourses”).
31
McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, supra note 6, at 419.
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mother,” and of the rhetoric employing such words encouraged me to undertake
my own analysis of the rhetoric of “irresponsibility.” Also aiding my analysis
were Fineman’s arguments about society’s positioning of the family—and
within the family, mothers—as the site to address the “inevitable dependency”
of human beings (particularly children and the elderly) and about the “derivative
dependency” resulting from such caretaking.32 My article enlisted Fineman’s
argument about how the state has relied upon the private (marital) family (of
male provider/female caretaker) to meet the burdens of inevitable dependency
and has subsidized it in various ways to do so.33 To counter the irresponsibility
critique of families who rely on “public sources . . . to meet these burdens of
dependency,” I drew on Fineman’s argument that the dependency of single
mothers “stems from the difficulty of engaging in the caretaking that women do
within the two-parent family and in acquiring the economic resources to do
so.”34 I argued that Fineman’s analysis “strengthen[ed] arguments” that society
has a public (collective) responsibility to address the burdens of inevitable
dependency.35 Observing that Fineman proposed “that we eliminate any special
status afforded marriage, redefine the basic family unit as the mother-child
caretaking unit, and redistribute to it the social and economic subsidies now
provided to the married family,” I expressed my own preference to expand,
rather than eliminate the legal category of marriage to include “other intimate
relationships, such as gay and lesbian marriage.”36 I also expressed concern over
whether Professor Fineman’s use of the “mother–child dyad”—albeit as a
metaphor—to connote the basic family paradigm meriting support would
nonetheless “inadvertently reinforc[e] gender norms about who should do
caretaking work.”37 Regardless, I concluded:
Whether or not one endorses Fineman’s proposal with respect to
marriage, her proposed redefinition of the family valuably highlights
the vital task of meeting the burdens of “inevitable dependency” as a
component of social reproduction and the way in which proponents of
reproductive responsibility fail to address the role of collective
responsibility in meeting those burdens.38

32
Id. at 417–19 (citing FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 30, at 161–76) (discussing Fineman’s
analysis of “inevitable dependency” and “derivative dependency” as “powerful” and illustrating that “one of
society’s most vital tasks is meeting the need of its ‘dependent’ members”).
33
See id. at 418 (citing FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 30, at 161–69, 226–27).
34
Id. (citing FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 30, at 164–66).
35
See id. at 417.
36
Id. at 418 & n.329 (citing FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 30, at 226–36).
37
Id. at 418 n.329.
38
Id. at 418 (footnote omitted) (citing FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 30, at 226–36).
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Fineman’s critique of “the rhetoric of fathers’ rights and responsibilities”
informed my critical analysis of the rhetoric of “responsible fatherhood” evident
in some calls for welfare reform and for shoring up men’s roles as fathers and
husbands.39 I evaluated arguments that family breakdown stemmed from
“women’s failure to engage successfully in their proper cultural task of
domesticating men or ‘taming’ men into marriage, monogamous commitment,
and paternal support of children.”40
Finally, Professor Fineman’s analysis of motherhood played a key role in
my article’s exploration of the interplay of agency and constraint in women’s
reproductive lives. I acknowledged Martha’s challenge to feminists to view
single motherhood as a deliberate choice, a “practice resistive to patriarchal
ideology.”41 I observed that Dorothy Roberts (referencing Fineman) similarly
suggested “that feminists should consider whether ‘deviant’ (single) mothers
might offer a glimpse of ‘liberated motherhood.’”42 I argued for the need to bring
that perspective on single motherhood into conversation with other feminist
analyses that identify male irresponsibility and unaccountability “as a cause of
unwanted pregnancy, abortion, single motherhood, family poverty, and family
violence,” and that critique “the ways that law permits or perpetuates such
irresponsibility.”43
On the one hand, I argued that “‘[d]eliberate choice’ may seem a strong word
to apply to women’s reproductive and mothering decisions, especially if such
choices flow from or are affected by male irresponsibility or dominance.”44 Yet,
given that Professor Fineman herself “describes motherhood as a ‘colonized’
concept to stress the ways that patriarchal ideology of motherhood shapes
women’s experiences,” I reasoned that “Fineman’s stance is certainly not
incompatible with recognizing constraints on choice.”45 Drawing on efforts by
feminist legal theorists to grapple with the interplay of choice and constraint in
models of the self and agency, I argued for developing a “[c]ontinuum [m]odel
of [a]gency and [r]esponsibility” as a useful framework for thinking about issues

39

Id. at 389–93 (citing FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 30, at 201–04).
Id. at 387 (first citing William Raspberry, Women Taming Men, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1993, at A17;
then citing David W. Murray, Countdown for the Family, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 1, 1994, at F1).
41
Id. at 430–32 (discussing FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 30, at 125).
42
Id. at 431 (citing Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U.
J. GENDER & L. 1, 28–29 (1993)).
43
Id. at 423–24 (first citing Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,
996–97 (1984); then citing Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 60–62
(1995); and then citing PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 116 (1991)).
44
Id. at 431.
45
Id. (citing FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 30, at 124–25).
40
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of sex, reproduction, abortion, and motherhood and for better informing publicpolicy debates.46
Professor Fineman’s analysis of the role of the family as a site of caretaking
and of how society privatizes dependency continued to shape my work, in the
years that followed, on care as a public value, the gendered economy of care,
and the vital role of families in carrying out the task of social reproduction (or
what Fineman called “societal preservation”).47 Similarly, in my critical
evaluation of various social movements calling for shoring up the family (i.e.,
the marital family) as a “seedbed of civic virtue,” such as the civil society
movement and the marriage movement, I continued to enlist Fineman’s work as
a valuable resource.48 At the same time, as I explain below, her critique of the
sexual (marital) family and her provocative proposal—further developed in her
subsequent book, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency—to shift the
focus of family law and the economic and social subsidies tied to marriage “to a
new family core connection—that of the caretaker-dependent”49—posed a
challenge to my own efforts to offer a liberal feminist account of the “place of
families” that retained marriage but embraced equality both within and among
families.

46
Id. at 432–34 (discussing Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995) and Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990)).
47
See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, Care As a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and
Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1710 (2001) [hereinafter McClain, Care As a Public Value]
(discussing Fineman’s analysis of “inevitable dependency” in FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 30, at
161–66, 226–36, and her analysis of “subsidy” in Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths:
Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13 (1999)).
48
See, e.g., Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 330–31 (2000) (pointing out that while “[f]atherless families are viewed by most
revivalists [such as David Blankenhorn] as the leading indicator (and a cause) of the crisis in civil society,” on
“some feminist views, fatherless families might seem to offer an alternative to patriarchy,” such as Fineman’s
call to subsidize the “Mother/Child dyad” (citations omitted)); id. at 330–33 (arguing: “Focusing upon the family
as an important site of social reproduction and caregiving could afford an important opportunity to argue that
supporting the work of social reproduction is a public responsibility, and to attempt to instantiate care as a public
value. (Indeed, this could be a common goal shared by civil society-revivalists and many feminists and
liberals.)”). At my invitation, Professor Fineman contributed an essay to the symposium that James Fleming and
I co-edited on calls to renew civil society. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Family in Civil Society, 75 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 531 (2000). On the marriage movement, see infra Part II.
49
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 123 (2004)
[hereinafter FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH].
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II. FORMATIVE PROJECTS
Beginning in the late 1990s, a central focus of my scholarship was
developing the idea of a formative project of fostering the capacities of
individuals for democratic and personal self-government. That effort was
synthetic and drew on civic republican, feminist, and liberal ideas. A spur to my
work on the importance of such a formative project was various civic republican,
feminist, and even liberal critiques that liberalism lacked the resources for such
a project because of its supposed commitment to neutrality and to a model of
toleration that left individuals alone in the name of autonomy, without attention
to supporting the preconditions for meaningful self-government.50 My concern
focused on the big picture, that is, on the respective roles of the family, other
institutions of civil society, and the state (in its various manifestations) in
fostering such capacities. The role of the family, specifically, became the focus
of my first book, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and
Responsibility.51
Geography, once again, was a tangible marker of my positioning in different,
although sometimes overlapping, feminist and liberal intellectual conversations.
By the late 1990s, Professor Fineman and the FLT Project had moved to a new
venue, Cornell Law School. Fortunately, I was able to hone my thinking about
this formative project, its evolving dimensions, and the place of families in such
a project as I shared pieces of it in workshops and Uncomfortable Conversations
hosted by Fineman’s relocated FLT Project. Glimmerings of the contours of the
formative project featured in a paper I gave in a workshop, in 1999,
“Discrimination and Inequality,”52 which grew into the article, Toward a
Formative Project of Securing Freedom and Equality,53 published in a Cornell
Law Review symposium inspired by the workshop.54 In an Uncomfortable
Conversation, “Children: Public Good or Individual Responsibility?,” I tested
out my efforts to enlist and synthesize civic republican, feminist, and liberal

50

See McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives, supra note 26.
LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY
(2006) [hereinafter MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES].
52
I presented the paper Some Thoughts About Facts, Sex/Gender Equality, and Constitutional Theory at
the Discrimination and Inequality, Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop, held at Cornell University School of
Law from June 17 to 19, 1999.
53
Linda C. McClain, Toward a Formative Project of Securing Freedom and Equality, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1221 (2000).
54
The Cornell Law Review held a live symposium from October 22 to 23, 1999, at which a number of
the panelists from the FLT Workshop presented their work. Symposium, Discrimination and Inequality:
Emerging Issues, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2000).
51
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ideas to argue for recognizing and supporting care as a “public value.”55 I was
able to develop my liberal feminist approach to sex education and sexual
responsibility and contrast it with conservative approaches (such as PRWORA’s
funding of “abstinence only until marriage” education), at both an
Uncomfortable Conversation at Cornell, “Sexuality and Feminist Theory,”56 and
at the FLT Project—The 20th Summer Workshop, held at the University of
Wisconsin–Madison (the first home of the FLT Project).57
During these years, another formative influence was constructive
conversations with liberal and liberal feminist political theorists and legal
scholars about reconstructing key liberal ideals (such as autonomy and privacy),
the contours of a formative project, and the role of families.58 Those
conversations took place in various settings, including during a sabbatical year
at the Harvard University Center for Ethics and the Professions.59 Presenting my
critique of the marriage movement and of governmental marriage promotion as
a tool of welfare policy in the Dworkin–Nagel Colloquium at N.Y.U. provided

55
That Uncomfortable Conversation took place from November 19 to 20, 1999 at Cornell Law School.
The resulting article was McClain, Care as a Public Value, supra note 47, which appeared in a symposium,
“The Structures of Care and Care Work,” edited by (my future colleague at Boston University School of Law)
Katharine Silbaugh.
56
My paper was Conservative Versus Feminist Sexual Economies: Beyond Abstinence?, presented at “An
Uncomfortable Conversation—Sexuality and Feminist Theory: Road Blocks, Detours and New Directions,”
held at Cornell Law School from November 15 to 16, 2002. I also helped Martha organize that Conversation.
57
That paper was Struggles over Teaching Sexual and Reproductive Responsibility: Beyond ‘Abstinence
Only’ and Women as Gatekeepers?, presented at “Feminism and Legal Theory Project—The 20th Summer
Workshop,” held at the University of Wisconsin–Madison from June 26 to 28, 2003.
58
One example is helpful conversations with my then-colleague and neighbor Amy Baehr, a liberal
feminist philosopher at Hofstra; at her invitation, I presented work to the New York Society for Women in
Philosophy (A Liberal Feminist Approach to Associations, presented on November 5, 2004 at the CUNY
Graduate Center) and contributed a chapter to her volume on feminist liberalism. See Linda C. McClain, The
Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools, and Sex Equality, in VARIETIES OF FEMINIST
LIBERALISM 207 (Amy R. Baehr ed., 2004). Liberal feminist scholar Mary Lyndon Shanley and I debated
marriage live (on MSNBC) and in print. See Should States Abolish Marriage?, LEGAL AFF.: DEBATE CLUB (May
16, 2005), http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_m0505.msp (online debate with Mary Lyndon
Shanley). I had the opportunity to engage Professor Anita Allen’s influential liberal feminist account of privacy
at the conference “Reconstructing Liberalism,” held at William & Mary School of Law from April 3 to 4, 1998.
See Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 759 (1999). Professor Allen also included me in a volume assessing the work of communitarian/civic
republican political theorist Michael Sandel. See James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, The Right of Privacy
in Sandel’s Procedural Republic, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN POLITICS,
LAW, AND PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 248 (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan Jr. eds., 1998).
59
The Center is now called the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics. While at Harvard, I had fruitful
conversations with liberal feminist political theorist Tamara Metz, who was also working on family and marriage
(what would become TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE FOR THEIR
DIVORCE (2010)). I also had the opportunity to meet with liberal political philosopher John Rawls, with whom
I had previously corresponded.
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instructive liberal perspectives.60 Conferences on constitutional and political
theory at nearby Fordham University School of Law, organized by liberal
constitutional theorist James Fleming, were another venue for productive
conversations about rights, responsibilities, and critiques of liberal political and
constitutional theory,61 and for articulating a liberal feminist approach to such
matters as the dual authority of parents and schools for educating children and
fostering civic virtue.62
The Place of Families took shape during the multiple conversations
facilitated by the FLT Project and by constructive engagement in liberal and
other venues.63 In that book, I argued that “[d]espite sustained concern over the
state of families, the question of the place of families in our constitutional and
political order has received insufficient attention,” and asserted that “underlying
the common impulse to link the state of families to the state of the nation is an
important idea: families have a place in the project of forming persons into
capable, responsible, self-governing citizens.”64 My argument was that
“[s]ociety depends upon such a formative process, but sharp points of
disagreement have arisen about its contours.”65 Beyond my acknowledged debt
to the FLT Project for so many “constructive exchanges”66 as I worked on the
book and the impact of wrestling with Professor Fineman’s ideas on this book,
I am also indebted to Martha for another reason. As a first-time book author, I
had the enormous good fortune that the acquisitions editor at Harvard University
Press turned (not surprisingly, given the proposed book’s topic and Professor
Fineman’s stature) to Martha for a review of the book proposal; Martha also
provided a generous book-jacket blurb.
60
On October 10, 2002, I presented the paper, Marriage and Social Health: Marriage Promotion,
Marriage (E)quality, and Welfare Reform, at the Colloquium in Legal, Political, and Social Philosophy, held at
N.Y.U. School of Law.
61
For example, the conference “Rawls and the Law,” held at Fordham University School of Law from
November 7 to 8, 2003, was memorable because I was on a panel with liberal feminist political philosopher
Susan Moller Okin and engaged with Okin’s critique of Rawls’s evolving position on the family. See Linda C.
McClain, Negotiating Gender and (Free and Equal) Citizenship: The Place of Associations, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1569 (2004).
62
See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools, and
Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617 (2001) (first presented at the conference, “The Constitution and the
Good Society,” held at Fordham University School of Law, from September 22 to 23, 2000).
63
See MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES, supra note 51.
64
Id. at 3.
65
Id.
66
See id. at ix (“I am especially indebted for the opportunity to present early drafts of several chapters of
the book in workshops sponsored by Martha Albertson Fineman’s Feminism and Legal Theory Project, in its
former venues at Columbia University and at Cornell Law School and at the 20th Summer Workshop, held at
University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am grateful to the many participants in those events for constructive
exchanges.”).
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In writing The Place of Families, I found myself both embracing and
resisting features of Professor Fineman’s analysis. Readily embraced from the
book’s opening pages was her diagnosis of “the indispensable, but
underappreciated, role of care in meeting the needs of human dependency and
the disproportionate role of women (both as paid and unpaid caregivers) in
meeting those needs.”67 The role of care was central in my argument about the
place of families in the task of social reproduction, part of the task of “fostering
capacity.”68 So, too, I drew on Fineman’s tackling of “the autonomy myth” in
my call for a social contract that recognized public responsibility to support
care.69 At the same time, her criticism of the autonomy myth and of liberalism
posed challenges to my liberal feminist orientation and my positioning of
fostering the capacity for democratic and personal self-government (i.e.,
autonomy) as a central aim of a formative project that melded key liberal,
feminist, and civic republican commitments. By way of response to this and
other feminist critiques of autonomy, I argued that “[a]utonomy does not imply
atomism,” and adopted “a notion of autonomy that recognizes that the self is
socially situated and develops in the context of, rather than independent of,
society and relationships.”70 Such a model, I argued, was “in harmony with
feminist models of relational autonomy,” and was particularly apt with respect
to an analysis of family law and the place of families.71 “It is by virtue of a
person’s participation in relationships of nurture and care, initially within
families and eventually in other forms of association, that he or she is able to
develop the capacity for autonomy.”72
Fineman’s critique of the autonomy myth went less to atomism, though, than
to the foundational myth of independence underlying the approach to “policymaking regarding family and poverty” in the United States73: we mistakenly
conceptualize family as independent of the state both in the sense of existing
apart from legal regulation and in the sense of existing independent of public
support. My book drew on both parts of Fineman’s critique, even while
67
Id. at 5 (first citing FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 49; then citing EVA FEDDER KITTAY,
LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY (1999)). I should note that Fineman herself
refers to “caretaking” rather than “caregiving.”
68
See id. at 85–114.
69
See id. at 21 (“Families are assigned primary—if not sole—responsibility for providing this kind of
care. However, Fineman contends, clinging to the ‘myth’ of autonomy as self-sufficiency keeps our social
institutions, laws, and policies from valuing such care and recognizing a collective responsibility to provide for
dependency.” (citing FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 49)).
70
Id. at 18.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 49, at 7.
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attempting, in my reconstruction of civic republican ideals like independence, to
recast them “in a way that will be more supportive of care as a public value.”74
With respect to the first dimension, I explained: “It is inaccurate to think of the
family as ‘independent’ of the state, since law sets the boundaries of what
constitutes a family, of what are parental rights and responsibilities, and of what
state interests justify intervening in family life.”75 And I concurred with Fineman
that regarding the family as “‘independent’ in the sense of being a self-sufficient
unit of caregiving meriting no support by government or other institutions or
civil society . . . represents a serious stumbling block to formulating a sound
family policy,” as illustrated in “the ongoing debates over welfare reform.”76
I found myself resisting Professor Fineman’s analysis, however, as I wrote
my chapters on the place of marriage. In particular, I struggled with her widely
discussed contention, in The Autonomy Myth, that “for all relevant and
appropriate societal purposes, we do not need marriage and we should abolish it
as a legal category” and, instead, “should transfer the social and economic
subsidies and privilege that marriage now receives to a new family core
connection—that of the caretaker-dependent.”77 The Autonomy Myth also
sketched, as a thought experiment, the advantages of abolishing marriage as a
legal category and, instead, using contracts and contract rules to regulate adult–
adult intimate relationships.78 As I wrote The Place of Families, the hardest
chapter was “Beyond Marriage?,” which opened with the above quote from
Professor Fineman as well as a quote from the Law Commission of Canada’s
report, Beyond Conjugality: “[Marriage] is no longer a sufficient model to
respond to the variety of relationships that exist in Canada today.”79 Wrestling
with the question, “why marriage?,” I critically considered two distinct
meanings of that question: “why only marriage?” (as in Beyond Conjugality) and
“why legal marriage at all?” (as in Fineman’s proposal). Responding to both
forms of that question helped me to develop my own “marriage plus” approach
that answered the question, “[s]hould society (and family law and policy) move
beyond marriage?,” with “yes and no.”80 With respect to the yes part of my
answer, consonant with my argument that fostering equality should be a core
74

MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES, supra note 51, at 91.
Id. (citing Martha A. Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1207–
09 (1999)).
76
Id.
77
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 49, at 123.
78
Id. at 133.
79
MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES, supra note 51, at 191 (alteration in original) (quoting LAW
COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE ADULT PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS 113 (2001)).
80
Id. at 193.
75
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aim of family law and policy, I contended that “[o]ne appropriate move beyond
traditional marriage . . . is to embrace more fully the public value of sex equality,
and thus equality within families, as a principle relevant to the regulation of
family life and to governmental support of marriage.”81 I also “argued that a
second valuable move, in the direction of equality among families, is to
recognize and support same-sex marriage.”82 In the chapter “Beyond
Marriage?,” I argued “for a third move beyond traditional marriage, also in the
direction of greater equality among families: extending governmental support
and recognition to other forms of family that foster some or all of the values and
goods associated with marital families.”83
It was the “no” part of my answer that most centrally engaged with
Fineman’s challenge. I argued: “Focusing family law on the caretakingdependent relationship, as Fineman proposes, has the considerable merits of
directing society’s attention to the important task of orderly social reproduction
and of fostering governmental support—rather than opprobrium—for singleparent and other nonmarital families.”84 At the same time, “it has the demerit of
removing—and treating primarily as a matter of private contract—another
valuable dimension of families: the intimate, committed bonds between adults
and the role that such relationships play in fostering goods as well as
interdependencies.”85 Instead, I argued “for a kinship registration system that
would offer governmental recognition and support to forms of intimate,
committed relationships other than marriage,” building on “the basic idea that
public recognition and support of committed intimate relationships may
contribute to their security and stability.”86 I drew on Beyond Conjugality “as an
instructive guide to the rationales for such a scheme and its possible contours.”87
For example, in identifying what relationships beyond marriage might be helped
by such a scheme, I identified unmarried cohabitants (many of whom had
children in their households); complex family forms (such as where “more than
two persons [are] acting in a parenting capacity toward children” or are in a
sexual affiliation); and the “‘close adult personal relationship’ that is not
conjugal” (i.e., sexual), such as between “two siblings, a parent and an adult
child, a caretaker and a care recipient, or two close friends” (the subject of

81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. (referring to Chapter 4, “Marriage Promotion, Marriage (E)quality, and Welfare Reform”).
Id. (referring to Chapter 5, “Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (discussing LAW COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 79).
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Beyond Conjugality).88 I observed that such a registration model could help
“various intergenerational relationships centered around caregiving, such as a
grandparent and child,” and also relationships beyond formal family ties.89 As
an example, I mentioned “the close adult personal relationship . . . formed
between two chefs, an eighty-seven-year old African American woman and a
forty-year-old white gay man who lives with and takes care of her,” quoting a
reporter’s observation that “this pair has ‘forged a genuine family, with a
devotion too rarely seen among blood relations.’”90
As I worked on the “Beyond Marriage?” chapter, a critical juncture was
bringing Professor Fineman, along with many other scholars, to Hofstra Law
School (where I taught at the time) for an interdisciplinary conference I helped
organize, “Marriage, Democracy, and Families,” held in 2003.91 Two years
earlier, Martha had published her provocative essay Why Marriage?,92 issuing
the challenge later articulated in her book The Autonomy Myth. Thus, we framed
the final roundtable around the topic “Intimate Affiliation and Democracy:
Beyond Marriage?” and regarded Professor Fineman as a crucial participant.93
We asked participants to consider such questions as: “Is government right to
focus on the marital relationship or should it focus on a broader range of forms
of intimacy, such as the parent-child/caretaker-dependent bond, the bonds of
extended family, and the bonds of friendship?”94 To the question, “[s]hould
family law and policy move beyond marriage?,” answers ranged from an
emphatic “no” from conservative legal scholar Lynn Wardle and the theologian
and marriage movement leader Don Browning to Professor Fineman’s emphatic
88

Id. at 197–98.
Id. at 198.
90
Id. at 209 (quoting Alex Witchel, Savoring the Chemistry of Southern Cooking, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2003, at F1).
91
The conference took place from March 14 to 15, 2003. My co-organizers were James Herbie DiFonzo,
Joanna L. Grossman, and John DeWitt Gregory. For the published symposium, see Symposium, Conference on
Marriage, Families, and Democracy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23 (2003), and Rachel F. Moran, Love with a Proper
Stranger: What Anti-Miscegenation Laws Can Tell Us About the Meaning of Race, Sex, and Marriage, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1663 (2004).
92
Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239 (2001).
93
In my own contribution to that symposium, I cited to Fineman’s Why Marriage?, id., as representative
of criticism of “marriage’s privileged place” and observed that the roundtable mentioned in text brought together
participants who offered “a rich diversity of perspectives on the question, ‘should family law and policy move
beyond marriage?,’” including Martha Fineman’s “call to abolish marriage as a state-sponsored institution
(relegating adult intimate relationships to the realm of private contract) and to center family law around the
parent-child, or caretaker-dependent relationship.” Linda C. McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy:
Beyond Marriage?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 379, 382 (2003) [hereinafter McClain, Intimate Affiliation and
Democracy].
94
Jordan Leigh Santeramo, Foreword, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 25 (2003) (quoting Brochure, Hofstra
University School of Law, A Conference on Marriage, Families, and Democracy).
89
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“yes.” In between were answers that would retain marriage (opened up to samesex couples) but insist on more room—and respect—for greater family pluralism
(for example, from sociologist Judith Stacey and law professor Martha
Ertman).95
Writing an article for the published symposium, in which I evaluated that
spectrum of responses, aided me in sorting out my position on how equality
within and among families should inform family law and policy and tackling the
“beyond marriage” question in The Place of Families.96 That conference was
also personally significant because, after so many years of benefitting from
participating in events hosted by Professor Fineman, I was able to host her at an
event. Happily, it would not be the last time.
III. BEYOND IDENTITIES AND THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PARADIGM?
In reflecting upon Martha Fineman’s generative scholarship and its
intersection with my own work, it is striking that, as she has urged in the last
decade that we move beyond identities and an antidiscrimination paradigm as a
way for law to address inequality to focus more on shared vulnerability and the
obligations of a responsive state, my own work seems increasingly—and even
stubbornly—focused on identity and discrimination. One reason is my focus on
controversies involving rights in evident conflict. Even so, I believe that
Professor Fineman and I share parallel concerns for securing autonomy and
equality, although our vocabularies and frameworks differ. Moreover, we both
have a keen interest in institutional design, that is, on the place of the state and
the various components of civil society (including the family) in, as Professor
Fineman would put it, fostering “resilience,”97 or, as I would put it, fostering
“capacity.”98 In this Part, I mention Professor Fineman’s development of
vulnerability theory and its intersection with my own ongoing projects.

95
Lynn Wardle, Don Browning, and Judith Stacey published articles based on their live presentations in
the published symposium. Symposium, supra note 91. Fineman’s paper for the symposium became part of her
book, The Autonomy Myth. FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 49; see McClain, Intimate Affiliation
and Democracy, supra note 93, 382 n.15. “[P]anelist Suzanne Goldberg cautioned that skepticism may be in
order about positing any significant relationship between forms of intimate self-government and democratic selfgovernment.” McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy, supra note 93, at 382.
96
See McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy, supra note 93; see also MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF
FAMILIES, supra note 51.
97
“Resilience” is a key concept on which Fineman draws in her vulnerability theory. See, e.g., Martha
Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 307, 320–28
(2014).
98
“Fostering capacity” is a key theme I develop in The Place of Families. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF
FAMILIES, supra note 51, at 15–114.
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A. Beyond “Gender Equality” to Vulnerability?
When I finished The Place of Families, I wanted to develop further my
argument that part of government’s formative project should be fostering and
promoting sex equality as a public value and constitutional commitment. Why,
I wanted to investigate, was sex equality so hard to achieve? Why did such a gap
remain between the formal commitment to equality and ongoing practices of
inequality? What obstacles hindered achieving the various dimensions of
women’s free and equal citizenship? What rationales justified inequality?
The FLT Project proved, once again, a fruitful setting to explore these
questions, since equality was a recurring topic. First in an Uncomfortable
Conversation on sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and feminism
(mentioned in Part I), and then at a conference celebrating the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the FLT Project in 2008, I was able to expound and critically
evaluate appeals to “nature” and hard-wired gender differences to rationalize
forms of sex inequality and criticize efforts to address such problems as the
gendered division of labor for caretaking as misguided feminist “social
engineering.”99 I also traced the role of appeals to evolutionary psychology in
judicial opinions to defend traditional marriage and oppose same-sex marriage.
My efforts resulted in a chapter that Professor Fineman included in the edited
volume, Transcending the Boundaries of Law: Generations of Feminism and
Legal Theory.100
When my colleague Joanna Grossman and I decided to plan a conference to
address the problem of the gap between a formal commitment to gender equality
and the equal citizenship of men and women and ongoing problems of gender
inequality, Professor Fineman was the obvious choice to deliver the keynote
address.101 After all, her still-influential book The Illusion of Equality identified

99

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See McClain, What’s So Hard About Sex Equality?, supra note 18. In asking why equality was so hard,
I was also interested in examining religious teachings about gender roles in the family, gender equality, and the
relative positioning of child, family, and state. At another FLT Project workshop, I was able to start that
investigation by assessing religious objections to the United States’ ratifying two human rights instruments, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. I presented the paper, Child, Family, and State in Religious Stances and Human Rights
Instruments: A Preliminary Comparison, at the FLT Workshop “Competing Paradigms of Rights and
Responsibility? Children in the Discourses of Religion and International Human Rights,” held at Emory
University School of Law from April 15 to 17, 2005. The revised paper became a chapter in What Is Right for
Children?. See McClain, Child, Family, State, and Gender Equality, supra note 19.
101
That conference, “Dimensions of Women’s Equal Citizenship,” took place at Hofstra University
School of Law from November 3 to 4, 2006. See Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, HOFSTRA L.,
https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/dwec/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). We subsequently published a
100
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problems with the goal of formal equality and her subsequent work, such as The
Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency, importantly explored the relationship
between autonomy and equality.102 Further, we admired Martha’s leadership in
facilitating, through the FLT Project and various edited volumes, significant
work on law and gender and feminist theory, and viewed our conference as a
modest effort inspired by that model.
Imagine our surprise, then, at the prescription offered in Professor Fineman’s
keynote address, Equality: Still Illusive After All These Years, delivered in the
fall of 2006: it is time to move “beyond gender”! Specifically, Professor
Fineman proposed that “one way to render equality less illusive is to move
beyond gender and build a more comprehensive framework on the concept of
universal human vulnerability.”103 By that time, Fineman had begun a new
scholarly project as a fruitful way to wrestle with problems of inequality and the
relationship between equality and autonomy, shifting from her focus on
“dependency” as a keyword to focusing on the concept of “vulnerability.”104
Specifically, Professor Fineman urged attention to the “inevitable and universal
vulnerability inherent in the human condition and the societal institutions that
have grown up around them, most notably the family and the state.”105 Gender,
she explained, was a “door through which [she] enter[s] the discussion about
equality – not the entire focus of [her] inquiry.”106 The inquiry would focus “on
privilege as well as discrimination and reflect[] on the benefits allocated through
the organization of society and its institutional structures.”107 Doing so,
Professor Fineman argued, “could move us closer to securing substantive
equality and social rights in the United States.”108
B. Building Resilience or Fostering Capacity?: The Role of the State
Despite my initial surprise at Professor Fineman’s shift to vulnerability
theory, and some lingering resistance, I have come to appreciate the benefits of
volume growing out of the conference proceedings. See GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP (Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009).
102
See, e.g., FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 49; FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY,
supra note 26.
103
The lecture is published, in a revised form, as Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality: Still Illusive After
All These Years, in GENDER EQUALITY, supra note 101, at 251, 251 [hereinafter Fineman, Equality: Still Illusive
After All These Years].
104
See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject].
105
Fineman, Equality: Still Illusive After All These Years, supra note 103, at 257.
106
Id. at 266.
107
Id. at 251.
108
Id.
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this new theoretical framework. Although our frameworks and vocabularies are
distinct, I also see some parallels between Professor Fineman’s analysis of
vulnerability and her keen focus on institutions and my own ongoing
examination of the respective roles of civil society and the state in a formative
project of fostering persons’ capacities for self-government. To be sure,
Professor Fineman critiques the “liberal subject” and replaces it with the
“vulnerable subject”; I resist attributing to liberalism—rather than to, say
neoliberalism or to truncated visions of autonomy—certain features of that
liberal subject. However, both of our projects take an interest in the big picture,
that is, in institutional design. The vulnerability paradigm focuses on the role of
institutions: how they allocate resources, privilege, benefits, and burdens, and
how they themselves may be vulnerable.109 Professor Fineman argues for a more
responsive state that “recognizes the universality and constancy of vulnerability,
as well as the need for providing for mechanisms for building resilience.”110
“Resilience,” as Professor Fineman recently wrote, “is the essential, but
incomplete antidote to our vulnerability.”111 “Resilience is what provides an
individual with the means and ability to recover from harm or setbacks,” and
“[t]he degree of resilience an individual has is largely dependent on the quality
and quantity of resources or assets that he or she has at their disposal or
command.”112
The language of resilience features in influential work on the ecology of
human development.113 Thus, one promising feature of Professor Fineman’s turn
to vulnerability theory is its invitation to focus on such ecology. In thinking
about the formative project that government and the institutions of civil society
should undertake, I have been attracted to the idea of social ecology and have
begun to explore, for example, what form a feminist social ecology might take.
For example, how might a more ecological approach inform family law? What
resources might we retrieve from prior feminist—or maternalist—visions about
a more responsive state and its relationship to civil society, such as those of Jane
Addams and other Progressive-era reformers?
109
See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 104, at 12–15; Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 256 (2010).
110
Martha Albertson Fineman, Introduction to PRIVATIZATION, VULNERABILITY, AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 4 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2017).
111
Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, supra note 97, at 320.
112
Id.
113
See, e.g., URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS BY
NATURE AND DESIGN (1979). Professor Fineman’s colleague Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has applied ideas of
social ecology and vulnerability in her work on a child-centered perspective in family law. See Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children Is a World Fit for Everyone: Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability,
46 HOUS. L. REV. 817 (2009).
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Examining the idea of social ecology in relationship both to vulnerability
theory and a formative project remains, at this writing, a work-in-progress.
Fortunately, I have had a chance to share my preliminary ideas on this topic in
FLT Project workshops, including a workshop in 2013, marking the Project’s
thirtieth anniversary.114 The next year, Professor Fineman provided another
opportunity under the auspices of the Vulnerability and the Human Condition
Initiative, when I worked with her to organize a workshop, “Theorizing the
State: The Resources of Vulnerability Theory.”115 In the law review article that
grew out of that workshop paper, I asked: “Is it finally time for a shift from
‘family policy’ to ‘family ecology’?”116 The impetus for my question was family
law scholar Clare Huntington’s book, Failure to Flourish: How Law
Undermines Family Relationships, which urged that family law should do more
to foster “strong, stable, positive relationships” and pay more heed to the social
contexts of how relationships develop.117 I pointed out that Huntington’s focus
on social environments and on Urie Bronfenbrenner’s work on the ecology of
human development had parallels to earlier work by family law scholars.118
Mary Ann Glendon, I noted, argued that public deliberation on families should
focus on “interconnected environments” and how, “[j]ust as individual identity
and well-being are influenced by conditions within families, families themselves
are sensitive to conditions within surrounding networks of groups—
neighborhoods, workplaces, churches, schools, and other associations.”119
Observing that calls for an ecological approach to family law, or even “a shift
114
These ideas were included in the papers Toward a Feminist “Social Ecology,” presented at
“Vulnerability, Resilience, and the State, A Feminism Legal Theory Project Workshop,” held at Emory
University School of Law from March 19 to 20, 2010 and The Family and the State: Muddles, Methods, and
Materials for a Feminist/New Progressive Social Ecology, presented at the “Feminism and Legal Theory Project
at 30: A Workshop on the Transformation of the Family and the Recognition and Regulation of Intimate Lives,”
held at Emory University School of Law from December 6 to 7, 2013.
115
Also helping to organize this workshop, held at Emory University School of Law from December 5 to
6, 2013, were Kathryn Abrams, June Carbone, and Eileen McDonagh, participants in the 2013 workshop on the
FLT Project at 30. At the workshop, I presented the paper Is There a Way Forward in the “War Over the
Family”?.
116
See Linda C. McClain, Is There a Way Forward in the “War Over the Family”?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 705,
717 (2015) [hereinafter McClain, Is There a Way Forward in the “War Over the Family”?] (omitting
capitalization) (reviewing CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS (2014)).
117
HUNTINGTON, supra note 116, at 5–25.
118
See McClain, Is There a Way Forward in the “War Over the Family”?, supra note 116, at 717–18
(discussing MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) and
Woodhouse, supra note 113); id. at 718 n.100 (noting Huntington’s praise “of a reformer deeply influenced by
Urie Bronfenbrenner’s idea of ‘human ecology and the networks that form among parents and others who care
for children’” (quoting HUNTINGTON, supra note 116, at 166)).
119
Id. at 717–18 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting GLENDON, supra note
118, at 130).
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from family law to family ecology,” had a long history,120 I also related
Huntington’s calls to enlist what she calls “the pervasive state” to help families
to flourish to Maxine Eichner’s argument for a “supportive state” and Professor
Fineman’s argument for a “responsive state.”121 I concluded that Huntington’s
“arguments about how to deploy the pervasive state—and family law—to foster
flourishing relationships are a useful complement to other theories of the state,
such as Fineman’s vulnerability theory, focused on the role of societal
institutions in providing resources and building resilience and of the state in
bringing into being and maintaining those institutions.”122 Citing Fineman, I
argued: “Moving forward, both the relational and institutional focus are vital
and, in a sense, are another way to think about the channeling function of law in
creating and supporting social institutions that allow realization of important
goods or ends.”123 I hope to have further conversations with Professor Fineman
on these questions of institutional design and the role of the state and civil
society.
C. Beyond Identities and Antidiscrimination Law?
1. Rights in Conflict?
Around the time that Professor Fineman was elaborating vulnerability
theory, I joined the faculty at Boston University School of Law. I would, once
again, have a chance to host Martha when our workshop committee invited her
to deliver Boston University School of Law’s 2011–2012 Annual Distinguished
Lecture. In that lecture and resulting published article, Beyond Identities: The
Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, Professor Fineman
articulated how vulnerability theory could address some of the problems with
the existing paradigm of antidiscrimination law.124 As a more promising path to

120

Id. at 717 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting GLENDON, supra note 118, at 130).
Id. at 716 (first citing HUNTINGTON, supra note 116, at 63; then citing MAXINE EICHNER, THE
SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 4–9 (2010); and then citing
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 109, at 262–63, 273–75).
122
Id. at 741 (emphasis omitted) (citing Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the
Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR
LAW AND POLITICS 13, 20–26 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013)).
123
Id. at 741 & n.260 (“The state is always at least a residual actor in the formation and functioning of
society and should accept some responsibility in regard to the effects and operation of those institutions it brings
into being and helps to maintain.” (quoting Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law
and Politics, supra note 122, at 25)).
124
Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to
Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713 (2012).
121
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equality, she urged a move beyond identities and toward a new approach opened
up by vulnerability theory’s focus on a more universal approach to identity.125
Over the last decade, a central focus in my work has been how to justify
rights and how to resolve conflicts involving rights—not only constitutional
rights but also rights arising under antidiscrimination law. Thus, Professor James
Fleming and I developed a framework that, in our book Ordered Liberty: Rights,
Responsibilities, and Virtues, we called “constitutional liberalism.”126 This
project took me back to some of my earliest engagements with liberalism: in
response to charges that the U.S. constitutional system exalts individual rights
over responsibilities, virtues, and the common good, Fleming and I developed
and defended a civic liberalism that takes responsibilities and virtues—as well
as rights—seriously. In addressing controversies involving rights in evident
conflict, we proposed a framework of mutual adjustment of basic liberties. For
example, one emerging conflict concerned, on the one hand, the constitutional
right of same-sex couples to marry and the protection of LGBT persons under
state antidiscrimination law and, on the other, First Amendment rights to the free
exercise of religion on the part of persons opposed, based on religious belief, to
same-sex marriage or to facilitating such marriages in any way.127 In Ordered
Liberty, we offered a preliminary framework for thinking about the issue of
religious exemptions.
For the last several years, I have continued to write about the evident clash
between religious liberty and other constitutional and civil rights, both in the
context of reproductive health (objections to the Affordable Care Act)128 and of
the liberty and equality of LGBT persons (including civil marriage equality).129
Obergefell v. Hodges’s holding that same-sex couples have the fundamental
right to marry in every state and the right to state recognition of such marriages
intensified the latter evident conflict.130 Spurred by the strong rhetoric of the
dissenting opinions in Obergefell that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
“disparage[d]” as “bigoted” those “who, as a matter of conscience, cannot accept

125

Id.
JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
VIRTUES (2013).
127
Id. at 169–76. The idea of “mutual adjustment of basic liberties” draws on Rawls.
128
See Linda C. McClain, Corporate Conscience and the Contraceptive Mandate: A Dworkinian Reading,
30 J.L. & RELIGION 136 (2015) (book review).
129
See Linda C. McClain, Civil Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, “Moral Disapproval,” and Tensions
Between Religious Liberty and Equality, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 87 (Timothy Samuel Shah et al. eds., 2016).
130
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
126
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same-sex marriage,”131 and that such religious believers risk being labeled and
treated as “bigots” if they dare to “repeat [their] views in public,”132 I have been
focused on the deployment of the rhetoric of bigotry and conscience in such
conflicts. The spike in the rhetoric of bigotry surrounding the 2016 presidential
campaign and in the first year of the Trump Administration was a further spur
to this project. My book in progress, Bigotry, Conscience, and Marriage: Past
and Present Controversies, addresses a number of puzzles about bigotry, such
as its relationship to conscience. I examine how the rhetoric features in past and
present controversies over marriage—interracial, interfaith, and same-sex—as
well as over the scope of antidiscrimination law.133 I have been analyzing
competing appeals to the civil rights past and what lessons that past teaches for
present-day struggles over civil rights and the scope of antidiscrimination law.
What does it mean, for example, to assert that a public official or a state wants
to be on the “right” rather than the “wrong side” of history—and of the law?134
Competing appeals to the civil rights past and disagreement about the force of
analogies between race and sex discrimination, on the one hand, and sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination, on the other, are pervasive in
controversies over the expansion of state antidiscrimination laws to protect
LGBT persons and the assertion of “conscience” and sincere religious belief as
grounds for exemptions from such laws.135 Thus, the keywords at the core of my
own current work are “bigotry” (and its synonyms) and “conscience.”

131

Id. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
133
See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, BIGOTRY, CONSCIENCE, AND MARRIAGE: PAST AND PRESENT CONTROVERSIES
(forthcoming 2019).
134
See, e.g., Timothy Williams & Trip Gabriel, Virginia’s New Attorney General Opposes Ban on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/new-virginia-attorney-generaldrops-defense-of-gay-marriage-ban.html (reporting that Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring said Virginia
“had too often been on the ‘wrong side’ of justice on civil rights matters” and had asked a federal court to
invalidate Virginia’s Defense of Marriage law, citing as cases in which Virginia’s leadership had failed: Brown
v. Board of Education, Loving v. Virginia, and United States v. Virginia); see also Eyder Peralta, Virginia’s New
Attorney General Will Not Defend Gay-Marriage Ban, NPR (Jan. 23, 2014, 12:17 AM), http://npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2014/01/23/265050444/virginias’new-attorney-general-will-not-defend-gay-marriage-ban
(quoting Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring, in NPR interview about his decision not to defend Virginia’s
Defense of Marriage Act, noting that Virginia had been on “the wrong side of history” and of “the law” in key
landmark cases on the past, and this time would be on the “right side of history” and the law).
135
I illustrate this infra while discussing the closely watched case, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, now before the U.S. Supreme Court. 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert denied sub
nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr.
25, 2016) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S.
Ct. 2290 (June 26, 2017).
132
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2. The Rhetoric of “Vulnerability” in Conflicts over Public
Accommodations Laws
How might these issues—in which arguments about identity and
discrimination are prominent—look through the lens of vulnerability theory? A
few years ago, I had the opportunity to share some preliminary thoughts on such
questions in a workshop, “Reproductive and Sexual Justice,” co-sponsored by
the Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative and Northeastern
University School of Law.136 I focused on the deployment of the language of
vulnerability in controversies over marriage “conscience protection” laws
proposed or enacted after Obergefell and over state bans on offering sexual
orientation change effort therapy to minors.137 This is, however, an unfinished
conversation that I hope to continue.
For example, I do know that, while Professor Fineman urges a move beyond
identities and antidiscrimination law, she also affirms that “specific identity
categories, such as sexuality, gender, and race have an important place in
vulnerability theory.”138 In the recent article, Vulnerability, Resilience, and
LGBT Youth, Fineman theorizes that, while “vulnerability is a fundamental and
universal part of the human condition, it is also necessary to simultaneously
recognize that vulnerability must be understood as particular, varied, and unique
on the individual level.”139 Thus, “[i]mpermissible bias and discrimination based
on sexuality, race and gender differences must continue to be addressed in law
and policy.”140 Fineman adds: “It is also critical to recognize the ways in which
differences can be the basis for community building and a source of strength and
resilience for individuals.”141 Using the helpful image of the “[g]eography of
[v]ulnerability” to refer to “[t]he places and spaces where young people must
build their resilience,” Fineman then explains how those primary “places and
spaces”—family, community, and school—“are failing many LGBT youth.”142

136
See Workshop on Reproductive and Sexual Justice, NE. U. SCH. L. (Apr. 29–30, 2016),
http://www.northeastern.edu/law/news/events/2016/rj-workshop/index.html.
137
See Linda C. McClain, Comparative Vulnerability and (Equal) Protection from Discrimination:
Framing (and Resolving) Conflicts Between Religious Liberty and Equality, presented at A Workshop on
Reproductive and Sexual Justice, Northeastern University School of Law (Apr. 29–30, 2016). Regrettably,
Martha Fineman was not able to attend the workshop, and so I was unable to discuss these issues with her at that
event, although we had some fruitful e-mail exchanges on the question prior to the workshop.
138
Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, supra note 97, at 316–17.
139
Id. at 317.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 321–22.
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During its 2017–2018 term, the Supreme Court will rule on Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,143 in which the baker (selfdescribed “cake artist”) Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, asks the
Court to decide “[w]hether applying Colorado’s public-accommodation law to
compel artists to create expression that violates their sincerely held religious
beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment.”144 Phillips appeals the ruling by the Colorado Court of
Appeals, affirming the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (CCRC) decision that
he violated the public accommodations provision of the Colorado
Antidiscrimination Act (CADA)—which (since 2008) prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation—when, citing his religious beliefs about
marriage, he declined to bake a cake for a celebration of Charlie Craig and David
Mullins’s wedding ceremony.145 The Colorado court held that denying Phillips
an exemption from CADA did not violate his First Amendment rights.146 The
court concluded that CADA “creates a hospitable environment for all
consumers,” which “prevents the economic and social balkanization prevalent
when businesses decide to serve only their own ‘kind.’”147
One lens that I employ elsewhere to evaluate this high-stakes case is to look
at how the parties and their amici (friends of the court) deploy the rhetoric of
bigotry and conscience and enlist—or distinguish—past civil rights struggles.148
In this section, I look through a different lens—how the parties and their amici
employ the rhetoric of vulnerability. This is a first step to consider how Professor
Fineman’s vulnerability theory might evaluate this rhetoric and, ultimately, the
best resolution of the case.149

143
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert denied sub nom.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25,
2016) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct.
2290 (June 26, 2017).
144
Brief for Petitioners at i, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 (Aug.
31, 2017).
145
Craig, 370 P.3d 272.
146
Id. at 294.
147
Id. at 293.
148
For such an analysis, see Linda C. McClain, The Rhetoric of Bigotry and Conscience in Battles over
“Religious Liberty v. LGBT Rights,” in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON
GROUND (William S. Eskridge Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144478.
149
The analysis in the next few paragraphs draws on Linda C. McClain, POV: SCOTUS Should Not Permit
“Boycott of Same-Sex Marriage,” BU TODAY (Dec. 19, 2017), http://www.bu.edu/today/2017/pov-in-scotuswedding-cake-case-kennedys-opinion-key/.
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Jack Phillips and his amici describe the plight of sincere Christians, like
Phillips, simply trying to live out their faith—indeed, their identity—in the
public square, but forced by overzealous civil rights commissioners applying—
some further argue—overly expansive civil rights laws to violate their
conscience or face significant loss of business and civil penalties.150 Another
brief discounts any vulnerability on the part of Craig and Mullins, asserting that
the case at hand does not involve a “persecuted and vulnerable same-sex couple
oppressed by a Christian business[],” but rather, a Christian business “being
targeted for no reason other than [its] moral and religious views.”151
Amici contrast the genuine governmental concern with discriminating based
on identity—with race discrimination being the paradigm case—and refusing to
create a customized good because of an offensive message such a good would
send (here, the approval of a same-sex marriage).152 This is not about
discriminating based on identity, that is, sexual orientation, but about living out
one’s own identity and not violating conscience. The amicus brief filed in
support of Phillips by “479 [c]reative [p]rofessionals” contends that “the harm
inflicted on vulnerable creative professionals [like Phillips] is forcing them to
promote causes they do not support as an unwilling mouthpiece of the State.”153
A brief filed by International Christian Photographers stresses how applying
Colorado’s public accommodations law to Philips “jeopardizes the right of many
other citizens who desire to act and speak consistent with their sincerely held
religious beliefs;” they add that “[p]hotographers, in particular, are vulnerable
to the same conflict in this case: namely, the use of public accommodation laws
to force creative professionals to speak and act against their beliefs.”154

150
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 144; Brief for Liberty Counsel as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner Seeking Reversal at 16–30, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111
(Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for Liberty Counsel].
151
Brief for Public Advocate of the United States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Sept. 7, 2017); see also Brief for Liberty Counsel, supra note 150, at 22–
25 (contrasting Congress’s “reasoned response” of imposing duties of nondiscrimination, in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, in the face of “a combination of public abuse of essential facilities and private violence [which] posed
a mortal threat to the individual liberties of vulnerable citizens, often on grounds of race,” with the overly
expansive scope of state public accommodations laws, such as Colorado’s (citing Richard A. Epstein, Public
Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right,
66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1290 (2014))).
152
See Brief for Liberty Counsel, supra note 150, at 17–18; Brief for the States of Texas et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Sept. 7, 2017).
153
Brief for 479 Creative Professionals as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 27, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Sept. 7, 2017) (citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 272
(D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
154
Brief for International Christian Photographers and Center for Arizona Policy as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 4–5, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Sept. 7, 2017).
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On the other hand, amici for the CCRC and for the couple denied service,
Craig and Mullins, stress that prior to CADA’s amendment to include “sexual
orientation,” previous “pitched, public, state-wide battles” over the status of
LGBT Coloradans left them “vulnerable, subject to discrimination and public
scorn.”155 In contrast to Phillips’s amici minimizing the injury Craig and Mullins
experienced, they stress the “dignitary and emotional injuries,” as well as
“tangible repercussions,” “from being told one is not worthy of being served on
equal footing with others.”156 The brief filed by LAMBDA Legal Defense and
Education Fund argues that discrimination against LGBT persons is “[p]ervasive
in [o]ur [s]ociety” and is a “widespread problem that permeates nearly every
aspect of public life.”157 LGBT people never know when they might confront a
denial of service, and Phillips’s refusal makes them aware that “even those living
in places with protections [like CADA] must confront the reality that they
remain vulnerable.”158 Amici enlist historical analogies to landmark federal
public accommodations laws to explain the core purposes of state public
accommodations law and resist a line drawing that would make race a special
case, arguing that, then as now, the Court should reject the argument that a
business owner’s First Amendment rights warrant an exemption from such
laws.159
A few briefs warrant attention for their use of the ideas of vulnerability, since
they may have some resonance with Fineman’s argument that, while
vulnerability is universal, it is also specific and particularized. For example, the
American Psychological Association asserts that “homosexuality remains
stigmatized” in the United states and documents that the LGBT population
remains “disproportionately vulnerable to physical violence and hate crimes.”160
As does Fineman’s article on LGBTQ youth, the brief details that sexual
minority youth are at “heightened risk,” for example, in schools.161
155
Brief for Colorado Organizations and Individuals as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Oct. 30, 2017).
156
Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 24, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Oct. 30, 2017).
157
Id. at 4.
158
Id. at 38–39.
159
Brief for Massachusetts et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, 7–11, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Oct. 30, 2017); Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2–3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Oct. 30, 2017).
160
Brief for American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13–14,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Oct. 30, 2017) (first citing PEW RESEARCH CTR., A SURVEY OF LGBT
AMERICANS: ATTITUDES, EXPERIENCES AND VALUES IN CHANGING TIMES 41 (2013); then citing G.M. Herek et
al., Psychological Sequelae of Hate-Crime Victimization Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults, 67 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 945, 948 (1999)).
161
Id. at 16–17.
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Some briefs detail the particular vulnerability to discrimination of
subpopulations of LGBT persons. An amicus brief filed by Services and
Advocacy for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Elders and the American
Society on Aging details numerous forms of discrimination in public
accommodations experienced by LGBT older adults, ranging from senior
housing to funeral homes and cemeteries.162 The brief argues (enlisting language
from Obergefell): “This case will determine whether LGBT people, including
millions of vulnerable LGBT older adults, will be ‘consigned to an instability
many’ of their contemporaries ‘would deem intolerable in their own lives.’”163
Another brief explains that, “[a]s a class, transgender people are especially
vulnerable to discrimination and harassment in their everyday lives,” and then
details this pervasive discrimination in “restaurants, mass transit, hotels, health
clinics, and other public spaces.”164 The amicus brief filed by the National
LGBTQ Task Force does not explicitly refer to vulnerability, but highlights that
LGBQT persons of color already experience “multiple layers of discrimination”
and allowing business owners to refuse goods and service based on their beliefs
could “open the door to intersectional discrimination against LGBTQ people of
color” based on a combination of characteristics.165
How is the rhetoric of vulnerability deployed in Masterpiece Cakeshop the
same or different from Fineman’s rhetoric? Is this the kind of “vulnerable
populations” rhetoric Fineman argues is “pernicious” and “stigmatizing,”166 or
does it point toward the responsive state’s obligation to ensure that society’s
institutions play a role in building resilience? How might Fineman intervene in
the very framing of these conflicts between rights in collision? Law, after all, is
a resource that people need, and both constitutional law and antidiscrimination
law allocate benefits and impose burdens. Antidiscrimination law aims to make
different kinds of resources—goods and services—available free from arbitrary
refusals based on identity categories, that is, because of who someone is. To
return to Fineman’s image of the “geography of vulnerability,” the “places and
spaces” in which to foster resilience, one amici argued that excluding “LGB
162
Brief for Services and Advocacy for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Elders and American
Society on Aging as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3–21, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Oct.
26, 2017).
163
Id. at 24 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015)).
164
Brief for Transgender Legal Defense and Education Fund as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 3, 6–7, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Oct. 30, 2017) (citing JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L GAY &
LESBIAN TASKFORCE & NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 124–35 (2011)).
165
Brief for National LGBTQ Task Force et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6, 9,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Oct. 30, 2017).
166
See Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, supra note 97, at 315–16.
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people” from the protection of such laws “can cause adverse outcomes for health
and well-being for LGB people,” while, in regions in the United States “where
LGB people have better social and legal conditions, they also have better health
and lesser health disparities compared with heterosexuals.”167
As usual, Justice Kennedy is likely to be the crucial vote in deciding
Masterpiece Cakeshop. At the oral argument, he expressed concern both about
the impact of a religious exemption on the “gay community” and about the
baker, whose religious beliefs had not been treated by the CCRC with mutual
tolerance and respect.168 “[T]olerance,” he admonished, “is essential in a free
society” and should be “mutual.”169
What would mutual tolerance and respect look like? How might
vulnerability theory contribute to such a concept?
I hope that there will be opportunities for further and deeper conversations
with Martha Fineman on these and other questions about the limits of—and
alternatives to—an antidiscrimination model.

167
Brief for Ilan H. Meyer, PhD and Other Social Scientists and Legal Scholars Who Study the LGB
Population as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 9, 26, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Oct. 30, 2017)
(first citing Mark L. Hatzenbuehler et al., State-Level Policies and Psychiatric Morbidity in Lesbian, Gay, and
Bisexual Populations, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2275 (2009); then citing Mark L. Hatzenbuehler et al., The Impact
of Institutional Discrimination on Psychiatric Disorders in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations: A
Prospective Study, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 452 (2010)). Notably, Adam P. Romero of the Williams Institute,
is an author of this brief. Id. at cover page. The brief also responds to an argument made in Mark Regnerus’s
amicus brief for the petitioner that challenged the model of “minority stress” because of the resilience some LGB
have in the face of adversity. Id. at 33 (“While research has found that some LGB people are resilient in the face
of adversity, others succumb to adverse health effects of minority stress.” (critiquing Brief for Mark Regnerus
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Sept. 7, 2017))). Romero has
been a participant in Professor Fineman’s FLT Project workshops and Uncomfortable Conservations and is coeditor with her of a book that grew out of some of those workshops. FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY:
INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009).
168
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16-111 (Dec. 5, 2017).
169
Id. The Court issued an opinion on June, 4, 2018 when this Essay was in final page proofs. Justice
Kennedy, in a 7-2 opinion, narrowly ruled for Phillips on the ground that the Commission’s “hostility” toward
his religious beliefs violated the First Amendment. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
584 U.S. ___ (2018) (slip op., at 18). Kennedy’s conclusions echoed his concerns at the oral argument: “the
Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ case was neither tolerant nor respectful of Phillips’ religious beliefs,”
and going forward: “these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious
beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”
Id. at ___ (slip op., at 17, 18).

